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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

the City's treated effluent was not fungible with the natural waters of
the San Marcos. When the effluent entered the San Marcos and
commingled with the natural flowing waters, which are property of the
State of Texas, the discharged effluent lost all characteristics that
distinguished it as separate property of the City. Therefore, at the
point of discharge, the City lost control and ownership of the formerly
captured groundwater. The City provided further support to the
appellate court's findings by failing to rebut contentions that the City
intended the transportation of the effluent as a preliminary form of
treatment because the commingling would dilute the concentrations
of effluent with the clean natural waters of the San Marcos before the
City treated the water for municipal use. The court continued by
narrowly interpreting cases allowing for water to be treated as a
fungible resource as involving waters of only the purest quality
exceeding that required of sewage effluent.
Since the appellate court ruled to invalidate the City's permit to
convey and divert its sewage effluent, the appellate court did not
address the City's concerns with limiting provisions initially imposed
on the now invalid permit. In recognizing the importance of the
state's scarce water resources, the appellate court stated that similar
plans to reuse effluent would have to be evaluated on a case-by-case
basis. In fact, the Texas Legislature passed a statute giving the
Commission the authority to approve permits exactly like the subject
of this litigation, but the appellate court found the law inapplicable to
the present case because the City's permit was pending prior to the
effective date of the law.
Sean tK Biddle

Maverick County Water & Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. Reyes, No. 0403-00421-CV, 2003 WL 22900914 (Tex. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 2003)
(holding trial court erred in suit for damages caused by flooding
resulting from a broken canal by refusing water district's plea to the
jurisdiction where, as a governmental unit, water district was immune
from suit for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, inverse
condemnation, and nuisance claims).
In April 2000, the manager of the Maverick County Water and
Improvement District No. 1 ("District"), in order to make more water
available for electricity and irrigation, increased the capacity of one of
its canals. On April 8, 2000, the canal broke and released water,
flooding Anita Reyes's property. The District invited Reyes to its April
12 board meeting, where the board president allegedly admitted
liability and promised to pay all damages. After the District informed
Reyes that it had denied her claim, she sued the District for breach of
contract, promissory estoppel, inverse condemnation, and nuisance in
the District Court for Maverick County. The District filed a plea to the
jurisdiction alleging sovereign immunity, which the trial court denied.
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The District brought an interlocutory appeal arguing that the trial
court erred in denying its plea to the jurisdiction because the trial
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy.
Reviewing the trial court's ruling de novo, the Texas Court of
Appeals, San Antonio explained that sovereign immunity defeats a
court's subject matter jurisdiction, and a Texas governmental unit is
immune from suit absent state consent. According to Texas case law,
to sue a governmental unit a party must demonstrate the court's
jurisdiction by alleging a valid immunity waiver. The court did not
analyze Reyes's argument that the board's promise formed an oral
contract because Reyes did not allege a statute providing waiving
sovereign immunity. The court further explained that the District
could only sue for contract damages if the District's board approved a
written contract. Reyes did not allege a written contract existed, so the
District remained immune.
The District argued that as a governmental unit it was not subject
to promissory estoppel. Under Texas case law, promissory estoppel
generally does not apply against governmental units exercising their
public or governmental functions. The court held that Reyes's claim
did not fall under the general rule's exception (for instances where no
governmental function is impaired and estoppel is necessary to
prevent injustice) because the District's governmental function
included water and floodwater distribution. Since the suit involved a
dispute over the District's water distribution for electricity and
irrigation purposes, applying promissory estoppel would impair the
District's governmental function.
Reyes also argued that the flooding constituted a physical taking.
To prevail on an inverse condemnation claim, the Texas Constitution
requires that "the governmental entity intentionally performed certain
acts that resulted in a taking of the property for a public use."
According to case law, negligence that contributes to damage does not
constitute a taking, but if the damage is "necessarily incident to or a
consequential result of an authorized intentional act," the state may be
liable. Here the court held that the flood damage was not a necessary
or substantially certain result of releasing more water into the canal,
and the inverse condemnation claim was not valid.
The court began its analysis of Reyes's claim that flooding
constituted a compensable nuisance by stating that a single temporary
event cannot support a nuisance claim. To maintain the claim, Reyes
must show the nuisance was "inherent in the condition or thing itself,
beyond that arising from alleged improper or negligent use." Since
Reyes failed to allege anything inherent in the canal rendering it a
nuisance, the court held the facts as pled did not constitute a valid
nuisance claim.
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Because the court held the District was immune from suit on all
four counts, the court reversed the trial court's order denying the plea
to the jurisdiction and rendered judgment dismissing the case for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.
Elizabeth Frost

UTAH
Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 84 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2003) (holding a
contract between two diverters governing shared use of diversion
facilities may not expand one party's diversions to more than its
decreed amount, nor could it restrict the other party's diversions to
less than his decreed water right so long as the first party's rights were
fully satisfied).
Green River Canal Company ("GRCC") and Lee Thayn owned
water rights on the Green River near Green River, Utah. GRCC owned
the diversion facilities by which both GRCC and Thayn diverted their
water. In 1952, GRCC and Wilson Produce Company ("Wilson"),
Thayn's predecessor-in-interest, executed a contract clarifying their
shared use of GRCC's diversion facilities. The parties amended the
contract later that year. In 1981, Thayn purchased Wilson's land. In
1995, GRCC sued Thayn, claiming Thayn breached the contract and
amendment (collectively "Agreements") by diverting more water than
permitted under the Agreements. GRCC alleged the Agreements
limited the quantity of water Thayn could divert through GRCC's
facilities, despite Thayn having acquired water rights in excess of the
amounts specified in the agreements. In entering summary judgment
for GRCC on its breach of contract claim, the Seventh District Court
found Thayn could not divert water in excess of the amounts specified
in the Agreements. Thayn appealed to the Utah Supreme Court. The
Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court's summary judgment,
ruling the Agreements were descriptive, not determinative, of the
parties' water rights at the time they executed the Agreements.
Both GRCC and Thayn used a 2500-foot long shared canal (the
"Raceway") to divert water from the Green River to their irrigation
canals. GRCC constructed its irrigation canal in 1880, and Wilson
constructed its irrigation canal in 1933. Because Wilson's canal lay
forty-two feet higher in elevation than GRCC's canal, Wilson pumped
water to its canal by remodeling a hydroelectric facility. Both GRCC's
canal inlet and Wilson's hydroelectric facility lay at the foot of the
Raceway. All water not diverted by GRCC flowed into Wilson's
After Thayn purchased Wilson's land, he
hydroelectric facility.
renovated the hydroelectric facility to generate electricity for sale.
GRCC and Wilson executed the contract in 1952 to govern their
shared use of the diversion facilities. The contract clarified GRCC's

